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Several recent laboratory experiments have shown that the use of explicit incentives—such as conditional
rewards and punishment—entail considerable “hidden” costs.  The costs are hidden in the sense thatthey
escape our attention if our reasoning is based on the assumption that people are exclusively self-interested.
This study represents a first attempt to explore whether, and to what extent, such considerations affect
equilibrium outcomes in the field.  Using data gathered from nearly 3000 households, we find little
support for the negative consequences of control in naturally-occurring labor markets.  In fact, even
though we find evidence that workers are reciprocal, we find that worker effort is maximized when




























  Behavioral economics has matured to the point where theorists are leveraging 
psychological insights to improve their models and government officials are using behavioral 
results to fine tune policy.  One particular result that has attracted increasing attention is the 
interaction of psychological and economic incentives (see, e.g., Frey, 1997; Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b; Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Sliwka, 2007).  For example, in a novel set 
of experiments, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) show that extrinsic incentives influence 
effort in an unexpected manner—small monetary incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation, 
resulting in a perverse relationship between incentives and effort.
1   
Complementing such insights is the line of work in the spirit of Fehr and Rockenbach 
(2003) and Fehr and List (2004), who find that the use of control and explicit incentives entail 
“hidden” costs:  such control causes the principal’s actions to backfire, leading to lower profits.  
As this literature points out, such effects are first order and should be a concern for economists 
interested in studying labor markets.  Yet, whether, and to what extent, such hidden costs 
manifest themselves outside the confines of the laboratory remains an important open empirical 
question (Levitt and List, 2007).  Difficulties arise, however, in finding natural instances where 
agents are randomly allocated to appropriate treatment groups to permit a clean test of the 
relevant hypotheses.  Because of these challenges, the literature has to date been unable to 
provide tests of the major hypotheses of ‘control’ in the field.   
  In this study, we make a first step in this direction.  We present an empirical approach 
that is composed of a set of field treatments that parallel the important economic features of the 
environments in Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), Fehr and List (2004), and the literature that has 
followed.  To do so, we examine solicitor (worker) effort in a door-to-door capital campaign for 
the Center for Natural Hazards Research at East Carolina University.  Importantly, we use 
natural incentives to exogenously change the action space of solicitors randomly assigned to one 
of three treatment groups.
2  In the baseline treatment, workers are provided a pre-announced, 
fixed hourly wage of $10.  In a second treatment, workers are provided an unconditional gift – a 
                                                 
1 Such results have also been reported in the psychology literature—see Deci (1971) and Lepper et al. (1973) for 
early studies.  A more recent overview can be found in Tang and Hall (1995).  The skeptical reader will enjoy 
Cameron and Pierce (1994) and Eisenberger and Cameron (1996), who present a dissenting view of the empirical 
evidence concerning intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.   
2 In this regard, our study shares similarity with Landry et al. (2011) who explore the effect of conditional and 
unconditional gifts on the generosity of potential donors and attendant public good provision in a series of 
temporally-linked field experiments.   copy of Freakonomics – in addition to the pre-announced hourly wage.  In our final treatment, 
the most opportunistic actions are ruled out by making the gift conditional – solicitors must raise 
at least $10 per hour to obtain the copy of Freakonomics.  If trust is a characteristic rewarded by 
workers, then the control evoked in the final treatment might crowd out effort compared to the 
second treatment – particularly amongst those who would have raised more than $10 if the gift 
were provided unconditionally.   
  Several insights emerge from our field experiment.  First, unconditional gifts have the 
ability to enhance worker productivity.  Solicitors in our unconditional gift treatment were 
approximately 56 percent more likely to elicit a contribution than counterparts in the baseline.  
Similarly, solicitors in this treatment raised approximately 10.1 to 63.4 percent more per hour 
than those in our baseline treatment.  These results are consonant with the existing literature (see, 
e.g., Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Cohn et al., 2009; Kube et al., 2010) 
and suggest that reciprocal motives are an important determinant of worker behavior.  
  Second, conditionality proves a profit enhancing strategy.  Participation rates and dollars 
raised per hour in our conditional gift treatment are higher than those observed in both the 
baseline and unconditional gift treatments.  For example, solicitors in our conditional gift 
treatment elicit contributions from nearly 26 percent of all households approached – a rate of 
giving that is approximately 68 percent (8 percent) greater than that observed in our baseline 
(unconditional gift) treatment.  Similarly, solicitors in our conditional gift treatment raise 
approximately 83 percent more per hour than counterparts receiving an unconditional gift and 
more than double that observed in our baseline group.   
  Finally, solicitors in the conditional gift treatment are approximately two and half to three 
times more likely to raise at least $10 per hour – the required threshold for receiving the gift – 
than are counterparts in our unconditional gift and baseline treatments respectively.  As this 
threshold corresponds with the level of productivity necessary to cover labor costs, conditionality 
therefore has a positive effect on net revenues.
3  Taken jointly, these data are at odds with 
models suggesting that agents respond adversely to control.  Accordingly, our data suggest that 
hidden cost relationships identified in prior laboratory studies (see, e.g., Fehr and List, 2004) do 
not arise in our field setting.   
                                                 
3 This result is consonant with Landry et al. (2011) who find that conditionality is an effective technology to screen 
donors and therefore provides a superior fund-raising mechanism in both the short- and long-run.   II. A Model of Gifts and the “Hidden Costs” of Control 
  To fix ideas we present a simple, illustrative model of worker behavior under both 
conditional and unconditional gifts.  In our model, the worker’s effort decision is governed by 
three key parameters: a cost of effort, a kindness parameter measuring the worker’s response to 
gifts from the firm, and a conditionality factor that is designed to capture the “hidden costs” 
relationship.  Our approach to modeling worker utility as a function of kindness between the firm 
and the worker is in the spirit of Rabin (1993) and Bellemare and Shearer (2009).   
  We follow Bellemare and Shearer (2009) and assume workers have utility that is 
additively separable over earnings, effort, and gifts: 
 
U(E, μG) = W(E) – C(E) + βYμG 
 
where W(E) represents monetary earnings, C(E) is the worker’s cost of effort function, and 
βYμG represents a kindness function that captures how workers respond to gifts from the firm.  
Intuitively, the kindness function specifies that the worker receives utility from reciprocating 
gifts and returning value to the firm (in terms of output Y).  Importantly, we assume that C(·) is 
twice differentiable and strictly increasing in E and that both W(·) and Y(·) are non-decreasing in 
effort.       
To capture the “hidden costs” relationship noted in the prior literature, we assume that 
feelings of reciprocity depend both on the consumption value of the gift, G, and its perceived 
generosity – represented by a parameter     ,  .  Throughout, we assume that  1    for a gift 
provided unconditionally and that   is reduced if receipt of the gift is conditioned on specific 
requirements.   
As a benchmark, consider the optimal effort choice of an agent with neoclassical 
preferences – i.e., those for whom μ = 0.  For such an agent, the optimal effort choice is given by 
the solution to the following first-order condition: 
 
         0  
 
Denote the solution to this problem as E
NC.   Consider now the optimal solution for an agent with reciprocal preferences receiving an 
unconditional gift of value G.  For such an agent, the optimal effort choice is given by the 
solution to the following first-order condition: 
 
                 0  
 
Denote the solution to this problem as E
UG.  Assuming that output is strictly increasing in effort, 
we thus have that E
UG > E
NC – i.e., providing a worker with reciprocal preferences an 
unconditional gift leads to higher effort.  Intuitively, the inclusion of the kindness function 
introduces an added benefit of effort.  Evaluated at E
NC, we thus have that the marginal benefit of 
effort exceeds the marginal cost and the agent will elect to increase effort. 
  Consider now the case where the situation where receipt of the gift is conditioned on a 
specific requirement.  For an agent with reciprocal preferences, the optimal effort choice is given 
by the solution to the following: 
 
                    0 
 
Denote the solution to this problem as E
CG.  Given our assumption that             1 , we thus 
have that E
CG < E
UG – i.e., the use of conditional gifts serves to crowd out effort.  Moreover, if 
one allows μ to take on negative values the optimal effort level would be less than that predicted 
by the neoclassical model which assumes away reciprocal preferences.  Such crowding captures 
the “hidden costs” relationship that has been documented in prior laboratory studies.          
III. Experimental Design 
  Our natural field experiment attempted to follow the spirit of the laboratory experiments 
while staying true to the naturalness of the environment.  In this way, we conducted our 
experiment as part of a door-to-door fundraising drive to support the Center for Natural Hazards 
Research at East Carolina University (ECU).  The Center for Natural Hazards Research was 
authorized to begin operations in the fall of 2004.  The Hazard Center was founded in respond to 
the widespread devastation in eastern North Carolina caused by hurricanes Dennis and Floyd and 
is designed to provide support and coordination for research on natural hazard risks.    In each treatment, households in predetermined neighborhood blocks in Pitt County, 
North Carolina were approached by a paid solicitor and asked if they would like to make a 
contribution to support the Hazard Center using a simple ask strategy (or voluntary contribution 
mechanism).  Households that answered the door were provided an informational brochure 
detailing the activities of the Hazard Center and read a fixed script that outlined the reason for 
the solicitor’s visit.  The script included a brief introduction that informed the resident of the 
purpose of their visit and a short summary of the nonprofit organization.
4  Potential donors were 
informed that all proceeds raised in the fundraising campaign would be used to fund research 
that benefits Pitt County and the surrounding area.   
   As Table 1 reveals, we employed a within-solicitor design using a total of fifty-five 
unique solicitors randomized into three treatment cells.  Our baseline, No Gift, treatment 
provided solicitors a flat wage of $10 per hour for working a two to three hour shift.  Of the fifty-
five solicitors employed, twelve were initially assigned to this treatment.  Solicitors in our 
Unconditional Gift treatment received a copy of the book Freakonomics as a gift from the 
Hazard Center in addition to the promised $10 per hour flat wage.  Nineteen solicitors were 
initially assigned this treatment.  Of these, seven elected to work a second (or third) shift for a 
flat wage of $10 per hour.   
Solicitors in our Conditional Gift treatment were informed that they would receive, in 
addition to the promised $10 per hour flat wage, a copy of Freakonomics as a gift from the 
Hazard Center should they raise at least $10 per hour.  Twenty-four solicitors were initially 
assigned to the Conditional Gift treatment.  Of these, five worked a second (or third) shift for the 
flat $10 per hour wage.  Before proceeding, it is important to note that in both gift treatments, 
solicitors did not learn that they would receive a copy of Freakonomics until arriving for work. 
  Each solicitor’s experience followed four steps: (1) consideration of an invitation to work 
as a paid volunteer for the research center, (2) an in-person interview, (3) a training session, and 
(4) participation as a solicitor in the door-to-door campaign.  All solicitors were recruited from 
the student body at ECU via flyers posted around campus, announcements on a university 
electronic bulletin board, and direct appeals to students during undergraduate courses.  Potential 
solicitors were informed that they would be paid $10 per hour during training and employment 
                                                 
4 The design discussion follows Landry et al. (2006) since recruitment and training of the solicitors was similar.  A 
copy of the script and informational brochure are provided in the Appendix.   and would work a single shift lasting three to four hours.  Interested students were instructed to 
contact the Economics Department to schedule an interview. 
Initial ten-minute interviews were conducted in private offices of the Economics 
Department faculty.  Upon arrival to the interview, students completed an application form and a 
short survey questionnaire.  Upon concluding the interview, every applicant was offered 
employment as a solicitor.  Once hired, all solicitors attended a one-hour training session 
conducted by the same researcher.  The training sessions provided solicitors with background 
information on the Hazard Center and an opportunity to practice the script in front of both the 
trainer and other personnel in the Economics Department. 
Solicitors worked in three to four hour shifts starting between 9 and 10am on Saturday 
morning, 1 and 2pm on both Saturday and Sunday afternoon, and at 5pm on both Tuesday and 
Wednesday evenings.
5  To control for any temporal differences in rates of giving, we were 
careful to run multiple treatments in all weekend shifts.   
A few important design issues should be discussed before proceeding to the results 
summary.  First, we wanted to maximize the expected effect of the unconditional gift on worker 
effort and, hence, associated scope for the hidden cost relationship to arise.  As noted in Gneezy 
and List (2006), gift-exchange has the greatest impact on solicitor effort during the first few 
hours of work, thus we hired workers for 3 to 4 hours of work.
6    
Second, in carrying out our door-to-door campaign we wished to solicit donors in a way 
that matched how fund-raisers carry out the task in the field.  Solicitors were therefore instructed 
to distribute an information brochure after introducing themselves to potential donors.  This 
provided legitimacy to the fundraising drive, as brochures are a common tool in the industry.  
Third, in order to provide a formal, standardized appearance, solicitors were given an attractive 
ECU t-shirt and were instructed to wear khaki pants (or shorts) during their door-to-door 
solicitations.  Fourth, each solicitor wore an identification badge that included his or her picture, 
name, and city solicitation permit number.  Fifth, we randomly allocated solicitors across 
neighborhoods. 
                                                 
5 To minimize the number of drivers (monitors) required to shuttle solicitors between ECU and the neighborhoods in 
which they were working, the start of weekend shifts were staggered by 30 minutes.  Further, to prevent potential 
contagion, solicitors riding in a particular shuttle met drivers at different locations on campus and were assigned the 
same treatment.    
6 Solicitors in Gneezy and List (2006) participated in the Hazard Center’s initial door-to-door fund-raising campaign 
which took place during the fall of 2004 and worked at least eight-hours.  While gift-exchange has a significant 
impact on worker effort in the three-hour block before lunch, the impact decays rapidly over time.     Finally, to summarize, we have gathered a rich set of household level control variables.  
Solicitors were provided with a record sheet that included columns to record the race, gender, 
and approximate age of potential donors, along with their contribution level.  The trainer stressed 
the importance of recording the contribution (or non-contribution) data immediately following 
the solicitation “sales pitch”.  
III. Experimental Results 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics including information on the success of solicitors 
across treatments.  For example, Table 1 indicates that solicitors in the baseline no-gift treatment 
approached a total of 1022 households and spoke with 431 of them.  Of those, approximately 
13.7 percent (or 59 of 431) contributed to the Hazard Center.  In total, solicitors raised $1998.84 
(or approximately $1.69 per solicitation) for the Hazard Center: $477.46 ($1.11 per solicitation) 
in the no-gift treatment, $456 (or $1.48 per solicitation) in the unconditional gift treatment, and 
$1065.38 (or $2.40 per solicitation) in the conditional gift treatment. 
A quick summary of the empirical results highlight that there are signs of significant gift 
exchange in the data:  solicitors in the unconditional gift treatment are 56 percent more likely to 
elicit contributions than counterparts from the control group.  However, the hidden cost 
relationship identified in prior laboratory studies does not arise in our setting.  Participation rates 
and dollars raised per hour in our conditional gift treatment are higher than those observed in 
both the baseline and unconditional gift treatments.  Moreover, solicitors in this treatment are 
significantly more likely to elicit contributions in excess of $10 per hour and thereby generate 
positive net revenues for the Hazard Center.  Hence, ‘control’ as defined in the literature 
provides a means to both stimulate worker productivity and enhance the profitability of fund-
raising efforts.  Evidence for these empirical findings are described more fully below. 
Unconditional Gifts and Reciprocity 
  Table 1 provides a summary of average donation rates and average contributions per hour 
across treatments.  As noted in the table, solicitors in our unconditional gift treatment are more 
likely to obtain a contribution than counterparts in the no-gift treatment.  For example, as shown 
in Figure 1, solicitors in the unconditional gift treatment elicit contributions from approximately 
23.7 percent of all households that answer the door.  In contrast, counterparts in our baseline, no-
gift, treatment are only able to elicit contributions from 15.2 percent of those answering the door.  A non-parametric Wilcoxon test indicates that this approximate 56 percent difference in 
participation rates is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.
7 
  We observe a similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern when examining total contribution 
levels.  Solicitors in our unconditional gift treatment raise approximately 10 percent more per 
hour ($8.61 versus $7.82) than counterparts in our baseline group.  If we restrict the sample and 
only consider outcomes from a solicitor’s first shift, the difference in dollars raised per hour 
increases more than six-fold ($8.61 versus $5.27).  Despite the magnitude of these differences, 
non-parametric Wilcoxon tests suggest that they are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  Yet, the difference for the restricted sample is significant at the p < 0.10 if we use a 
parametric t-test as an alternative to the Wilcoxon test. 
Interestingly, these differences are driven entirely by increased fund-raising success at 
households who open the door rather than disparities in the number of households approached 
per hour.  In fact, households in our unconditional gift treatment approach approximately 8.1 
percent fewer households per hour than counterparts in the no-gift treatment – a difference that is 
significant at the p < 0.10 level.
 8      
  To complement these unconditional insights, we estimate a series of linear regression 
models that explicitly control for unobservable differences across solicitors.  Specifically, we 
estimate regression models of donation rates and average dollars raised per hour for each 
solicitor on dummy variables for our experimental treatments and other controls: 
 
Yi = Ziδ + Xiβ + εi 
 
where Yi is the donation rate (average dollars raised per hour) for the i
th solicitor, Z is a vector of 
treatment group status indicators, and X is a vector of other covariates – including the proportion 
of warm- and cold-list households approached by the i
th solicitor.  As noted in Landry et al. 
(2010), warm-list (cold-list) households are significantly more (less) likely to contribute than the 
                                                 
7 The unit of observation for all of these Wilcoxon tests is a solicitor-specific measure.  Tests for the full sample are 
therefore based on 28 observations in the no-gift treatment, 24 observations in the conditional gift treatment, and 19 
observations in the unconditional gift treatment.  Similar results are obtained if we used the household as the unit of 
observation. 
8 It is important to note, however, that differences in the number of households approached per hour is a poor proxy 
for effort.  Solicitations to households that do not contribute are typically very quick compared to visits that yield 
contributions. Households that make contributions require more time as the solicitor has to wait for the household to 
write a check and must complete a receipt to give to the donors.   randomly approached individual.  Although the proportion of such households approached 
should be orthogonal to treatment, we include controls for these factors to account slight 
imbalances across neighborhood blocks.  To account for unobservable heterogeneity, we cluster 
standard errors in the full sample on individual solicitors.       
  Empirical estimates for the full sample are contained in Models A and C of Table 2.  In 
terms of donation rates, Model A provides evidence consistent with our non-parametric results: 
solicitors in our unconditional gift treatment are approximately 60 percent more likely to elicit a 
contribution than counterparts in the baseline group, with this difference being significant at the 
p < 0.05 level.  Yet, higher rates of giving in our unconditional gift treatment do not map into 
higher average earnings.  As noted in Model C, the approximate $1.79 difference in the average 
dollars raised per hour across our unconditional gift and baseline treatments is not significant at 
any meaningful level. 
  Estimates for the restricted sample highlight similar data patterns.  As noted in Model B, 
solicitors in the unconditional gift treatment are more than twice as likely as counterparts in the 
control to elicit a contribution – a difference that is significant at the p < 0.05 level.  As noted in 
Model D, however, the approximate $2.59 increase in dollars raised per hour is not significant at 
meaningful levels. Taken jointly, these data suggest a first result: 
 
Result 1: Reciprocal motives are an important driver of worker behavior.  Workers who receive 
an unconditional gift are more likely to elicit donations and raise more dollars per hour than 
their non-gifted counterparts. 
 
Importantly, Result 1 serves to reinforce conclusions from the laboratory and field experimental 
literature, which finds that providing solicitors an unconditional gift leads to an approximate 72 
percent increase in the dollars raised over the first three hours of work (see, e.g., Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993; Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; 
Hannan et al., 2002; Charness, 2004; and the field:  Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and 
Shearer, 2009; Cohn et al., 2009; Kube et al., 2010).
9          
                                                 
9 Bellemare and Shearer (2009) double the daily wage for workers in a tree-planting firm and find an approximate 
10 percent increase in the number of trees planted.  Cohn et al. (2009) implement a wage increase during a 
newspaper promotion and find that workers approach four to five percent more passers-by than counterparts in the Conditional Gifts and the “Costs” of Control    
  The third column of Table 1 summarizes donation rates and average dollars raised per 
hour for solicitors in the conditional gift treatment.  As noted in the table, solicitors in this 
treatment are more likely to elicit a donation and raise more money per hour than worker 
counterparts in either the baseline or unconditional gift treatment.  For example, as shown in 
Figure 1, solicitors in the conditional gift treatment are approximately 68.4 percent (8.01 percent) 
more likely to elicit a contribution than are workers in our baseline (unconditional gift) 
treatment.  Using a non-parametric Wilcoxon test, the former difference is statistically significant 
at the p < 0.05 level.   
Our data suggest similar differences for average dollars raised per hour: solicitors in the 
conditional gift treatment raise more than twice the amount (approximately 83.4 percent more 
than) earned by counterparts in the no-gift (unconditional gift) treatment.  If we restrict the 
sample and consider only outcomes from a solicitor’s first shift, this former difference doubles – 
solicitors in the conditional gift treatment raise more than three times that raised by those in the 
baseline group.  Figure 2 illustrates these differences for both the full and restricted samples – all 
of which are significant at the p < 0.05 level a non-parametric Wilcoxon test. 
To complement these unconditional non-parameteric results, we consider the regression 
estimates contained in Table 2.  In terms of donation rates, Model A provides evidence 
consistent with the raw data – solicitors in the conditional gift treatment are approximately 67 
percent (3.84 percent) more likely to elicit contributions than counterparts in our baseline 
(unconditional gift) treatment.  While this former difference is significant at the p < 0.05 level, 
the latter is not significant at any meaningful level.  Estimates for the restricted data sample in 
Model B highlight similar data patterns.  Solicitors in the conditional gift treatment are 
approximately 140 percent more likely to elicit a donation than counterparts in the baseline 
group – a difference that is also significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
Our data highlight similar differences for average dollars raised per hour.  As noted in 
Model C of Table 2, solicitors in the conditional gift treatment raise nearly $9.00 more per hour 
than counterparts in the baseline and approximately 77.3 percent more than those receiving an 
unconditional gift – differences that are significant at the p < 0.05 level.  If, as in Model D, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
control group.  Kube et al. (2010) find student workers receiving an unconditional gift – a plastic thermos bottle – 
catalog 30 percent more library books than counterparts in the control group.                restrict the sample, the difference in average earnings per hour between the baseline and 
conditional gift treatments increases.            
Taken jointly, these data suggest a second result: 
 
Result 2:  The hidden costs of control do not arise in our setting.  Donation rates and dollars 
raised per hour are greatest in the conditional gift treatment.  
Result 2 is at odds with the existing evidence from the laboratory and opens up the possibility 
that the hidden cost relationships may not generalize to field settings.  For employers, this 
finding is noteworthy as it calls into question whether agents respond adversely to control – a 
premise from this line of work.  Although data from our unconditional gift treatment suggest 
reciprocal motives influence worker behavior, providing workers a conditional gift netted both 
more donors and total contributions per dollar spent on labor. 
  For fund-raising professionals, Result 2 is noteworthy as it suggests a fundamental 
difference in the effect of incentivizing workers as opposed to potential donors.  The gains to 
donor-side incentives such as charitable lotteries, donor gifts, matching grants, and rebates 
accrue largely along the extensive margin via increased participation rates (see, e.g., Landry et 
al., 2006; Falk 2007; Karlan and List, 2007; Meier, 2007; Aplizar et al., 2008; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008; Landry et al., 2010).  In contrast, our data suggest that linking worker 
compensation to dollars raised generates gains along both the intensive and extensive margins.   
The Likelihood of Exceeding the Target Threshold 
  Falk and Kosfeld (2006) highlight an important channel through which control serves to 
influence payoffs to the principal – agents pool at the minimum effort level.  For example, in 
their low-control treatment, over 50 percent of all agents provide the minimum effort level when 
the principal elected to enact control.  In contrast, median effort is approximately four times this 
level when the principal elected not to enact control.  As only 20 percent of the agents would 
select effort levels below the minimum level in the absence of control, the net effect is a 
reduction in earnings for the principal.   
  Given this underlying data pattern, one might therefore intuit that crowding is most 
pronounced for small incentives and associated levels of control.  As such, one might question 
whether the benefits from conditionality in our study only arise as our threshold is sufficiently large.  Yet, if this were the case, we would expect a non-trivial subset of agents in the conditional 
gift treatment to pool at the $10 threshold.   
Importantly, however, we observe no such pooling in our data.  Agents in our conditional 
gift treatment are more likely to raise almost any amount above $10 per hour than counterparts in 
either the baseline or unconditional gift treatment.  As illustrated in Figure 3, the cumulative 
distribution of dollars raised per hour for the conditional gift treatment lies everywhere to the 
right of the corresponding distribution for the unconditional gift treatment.  We observe similar 
differences when comparing the distribution of dollars raised per hour across the conditional gift 
and baseline treatments.  The former lies to the right of the latter over all but the extreme right 
tail of the support – i.e., contribution rates that exceed $30 per hour.   
  Similarly, agents in the conditional gift treatment are significantly more likely to raise the 
$10 per hour required to obtain the gift than counterparts in either the baseline or unconditional 
gift treatment.  For example, as illustrated in Figure 4, approximately 83.3 percent (20 of 24) of 
all solicitors in our conditional gift treatment raise at least $10 per hour and thus receive a copy 
of Freakonomics.  This proportion is more than twice (three-times) that observed amongst 
solicitors in our unconditional gift (baseline) treatment – differences that are significant at the p 
< 0.05 level using a two sample test of proportions. 
  To complement this summary of the raw data, we estimate a probit model that explicitly 
controls for unobservable differences across solicitors.  Specifically, we estimate whether a 
solicitor raised enough per hour to receive the copy of Freakonomics on dummy variables for 
our experimental treatments and other controls: 
 
         $ 1 0     Ω                $10  
 
where Ti  is the average contributions per hour for the i
th solicitor,  Ω is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution, Z is a vector of treatment group status indicators, and X is a vector of 
other covariates – including the proportion of warm- and cold-list households approached by the 
i
th solicitor.  To account for unobservable heterogeneity, we cluster standard errors in the full 
sample on individual solicitors. 
  Empirical estimates are provided in Table 3 and provide evidence consistent with the raw 
data summary.  Using estimates from Model A, the predicted probability a solicitor in the baseline (unconditional gift) treatment elicits contributions in excess of $10 per hour is 
approximately 17.1 (36.8) percent.
10  For solicitors in the conditional gift treatment, the 
estimated 83.9 percent probability of eliciting contributions in excess of this amount is 
approximately four-times (128 percent) greater than that observed in our baseline (unconditional 
gift) treatment.  Both of these differences are significant at the p < 0.05 level.   
We observe similar results if the sample is restricted to outcomes from a solicitor’s first 
shift only.  In this instance, however, the estimated six-fold difference in the probability of 
eliciting more than $10 per hour across our baseline and unconditional gift treatments (4.6 versus 
30.8 percent) obtains statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level.  Moreover, the differences 
between conditional and unconditional treatments and conditional and baseline treatments for the 
restricted sample are large and statistically significant for p < 0.05. 
  As workers in all three treatments were paid a fixed wage of $10 per hour, the Hazard 
Center only earned positive net revenue on solicitors who raised at least this amount.  Taken 
jointly with the data summarized above, this suggests a third result: 
 
Result 3:  Controlling solicitors by providing a conditional gift, has a positive effect on net 
revenue and is thus a profit enhancing strategy for the Hazard Center. 
 
Net labor costs, the average solicitor in our conditional gift treatment raises approximately $5.79 
per hour for the Hazard Center.  In contrast, the Hazard Center loses an average of approximately 
$2.18 per hour ($1.39 per hour) on solicitors in the baseline (unconditional gift) treatment.  Thus, 
in our setting, control provides a means to both stimulate worker productivity and enhance the 
profitability of fund-raising efforts. 
IV.  Conclusions 
  There is a growing body of laboratory evidence showing that the use of control and 
explicit incentives entail “hidden” costs (see, e.g., Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 
2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).  Despite its profound implications, there is a dearth of 
compelling evidence from naturally-occurring markets to support or refute this view.  Finding 
natural instances where agents are properly randomized into relevant treatment groups is 
                                                 
10 The predicted probabilities are evaluated at the sample mean for the proportion of warm- and cold-list households 
approached.   challenging, however.  As such, determining the extent to which these laboratory results 
generalize to real world setting remains unclear.     
We begin to resolve this uncertainty by exploring individual behavior in the labor market 
for solicitors in a door-to-door fund-raising campaign.  Our empirical approach is composed of a 
set of field treatments that parallel the economic features of the environments in previous studies 
examining the “hidden” costs of control:  we use natural incentives to exogenously change the 
solicitors’ action space.  If trust is a characteristic rewarded by workers, then the control evoked 
by restricting the solicitors’ action space should crowd out effort.  
Data from our natural field experiment suggest two main insights.  First, unconditional 
gifts enhance worker productivity.  This result is consonant with a bulk of the existing literature 
and suggests that reciprocal motives are an important determinant of worker behavior in this 
setting.  Second, conditionality is a profit enhancing wage structure for the Hazard Center.  
Participation rates and dollars raised per hour in our conditional gift treatment are higher than 
those observed in both the baseline and unconditional gift treatments.  Accordingly, our data are 
inconsistent with the notion that agents respond adversely to control, and suggest that the hidden 
cost relationship does not arise in our setting.       
  
 
  References 
Alpizar, Francisco, Frederik Carlsson, and Olof Johansson-Stenman, “Anonymity, Reciprocity, 
and Conformity: Evidence from Voluntary Contributions to a National Park in Costa 
Rica,” Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008), pp. 1047 – 1060.  
Bellemare, Charles and Bruce Shearer. “Gift Giving and Worker Productivity: Evidence from a 
Firm Level Experiment,” Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (2009): 233-244. 
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 70 (2003): 489-520. 
Cameron, Judy and W. David Pierce. “Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic Motivation: A 
Meta-Analysis,” Review of Educational Research, 64 (1994): 363-423. 
Charness, Gary. “Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market,” Journal of 
Labor Economics, 22 (2004): 665-688. 
Cohn, A., Ernst Fehr, and Lorenz Goette, “Gift Exchange and Effort: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment,” Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper (2009). 
Deci, Edward L.  “The Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18 (1971): 105-115. 
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip J. Grossman, “Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: A Natural 
Field Experiment Comparing Matching and Rebate Subsidies,” Experimental Economics, 
11 (2008), pp. 234 – 252. 
Eisenberger, Robert and Judy Cameron, “Detrimental Effects of Reward: Reality or Myth?” 
American Psychologist, 51 (1996): 1153-1166. 
Falk, Armin, “Gift-Exchange in the Field,” Econometrica, 75 (2007), pp. 1501 – 1512.  
Falk, Armin and Michael Kosfeld.  “The Hidden Costs of Control,” American Economic Review, 
96 (2006): 1611-1630.   
Fehr, Ernst and Armin Falk. 1999. Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market. 
Journal of Political Economy 107, no.1:106-34. 
Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gächter and Georg Kirchsteiger. 1997. Reciprocity as a Contract 
Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence. Econometrica 65, 833-60. 
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl. 1993. Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? 
An Experimental Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 437-59. Fehr, Ernst and John A. List. “The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives – Trust and 
Trustworthiness among CEOs,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 
(2004): 743-771. 
Fehr, Ernst and Bettina Rockenbach, “Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism,” 
Nature, 422 (2003): 137-140. 
Frey, Bruno.  “On the Relationship between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation,” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15 (1997): 427-439. 
Gneezy, Uri and John A. List. 2006. Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift 
Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments. Econometrica 74, no. 5, 1365-84.  
Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini.  “A Fine is a Price,” Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (2000a): 1-
17. 
—, “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000b): 791-810. 
Hannan, R. Lynn, John H. Kagel, and Donald V. Moser. “Partial Gift Exchange in an 
Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity 
Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior,” Journal of Labor Economics, 20 (2002): 
923-951. 
Karlan, Dean and John A. List, “Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving?  Evidence from a 
Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 97 (2007), pp. 1774 
– 1793.   
Kube, Sebastian, Michel Andre Marechal and Clemens Puppe. “The Currency of Reciprocity – 
Gift-Exchange in the Workplace,” Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
Working Paper No. 377 (2010).     
Landry, Craig E., Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, and Nicholas G. Rupp, 
“Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2006), pp. 742 – 782.   
Landry, Craig E., Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, and Nicholas G. Rupp, “Is a 
Donor in Hand Better than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field 
Experiment,” American Economic Review, 100 (2010): pp. 958-983. 
Landry, Craig E., Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, and Nicholas G. Rupp, “The 
Hidden Benefits of Control: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment,” Working Paper, 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville (2011). Lepper, Mark, David Greene and Richard Nisbett. “Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest 
with Extrinsic Reward,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28 (1973): 129-
137. 
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List, “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social 
Preferences Reveal About the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 
(2007): 153-174. 
Meier, Stephan, “Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run?  Matching 
Donations in a Field Experiment,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 
(2007), pp. 1203 – 1222. 
Rabin, Matthew.  “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American 
Economic Review, 83 (1993): 1281-1302. 
Sliwka, Dirk. “Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes,” 
American Economic Review, 97 (2007): 999-1012. 
Tang, Shuhua and V.C. Hall, “The Overjustification Effect: A Meta-Analysis,” Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 9 (1995): 365-404. 
 
  Table 1:  Summary Statistics 




Full Sample – Panel Data     
# of Worker Shifts  28  19  24 
# of HHs Approached  1022  722  1029 
# of Doors Answered  431  308  443 
# of HHs Contributing  59  66  109 
Total Dollars Raised  $477.46  $456  $1065.38 
Total Hours Worked  67.5  50.5  67.75 
Solicitor Specific Averages     
























# Workers Exceeding 







Restricted Sample*     
# of Unique Workers  12  19  24 
# of HHs Approached  495  722  1029 
# of Doors Answered  207  308  443 
# of HHs Contributing  23  66  109 
Total Dollars Raised  $177  $456  $1065.38 
Total Hours Worked  32  50.5  67.75 
Solicitor Specific Averages     
























# Workers Exceeding 








*The restricted sample only includes data from the initial three hour solicitation shift worked. 
 Table 2: Estimating Performance Measures 





$’s Raised per 
Hour 
Model D 
$’s Raised per 
Hour 


















































        
Data Sample:  Full  Restricted  Full  Restricted 
# of Observations  71  55  71  55 
Clustered Standard 
Errors 
Yes No  Yes  No 
R-Squared 0.19  0.15  0.22  0.26 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level 
 
Note:  Cell entries are parameter estimates from a series of linear regression models examining two 
different performance metrics for each solicitor – the percentage of HH’s that contributed to the Hazard 
Center and total $’s raised per hour worked.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  We cluster standard 
errors on individual solicitors.  The restricted data includes only contributions collected during the initial 
three hour solicitation shift worked.Table 3:  Probability of Raising $10+ per Hour 
  Model A  Model B 
























    
Data Sample:  Full  Restricted 
# of Observations  71  55 
Clustered Standard Errors  Yes  No 
Log Likelihood  -37.75  -26.00 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
 
Note:  Cell entries are parameter estimates for a probit model examining the likelihood a solicitor raises 
at least $10 per hour – the target threshold for receiving the conditional gift.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Model A clusters standard errors on individual solicitors.  The restricted data in Model B 
includes only contributions collected during the initial three hour solicitation shift worked  
  Figure 1:  Proportion of Households Contributing to the Hazard Center 
  
 
Figure 2:  Average Contributions ($’s) Raised per Hour Work 
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